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Economic Development, Religion, and the Conditions 
for Domestic Terrorism 
 
BRANDON M. BOYLAN 
University of Pittsburgh 
Ph.D. Candidate, Public and International Affairs 
 
 
This study examines the conditions that facilitate domestic terrorism.  Research on domestic 
terrorism has been sparse in comparison to studies that examine terrorism as a general 
phenomenon and transnational terrorism in particular.  Most researchers find that a country’s 
level of economic development and religious composition do not help explain its experience with 
terrorism.  I examine if these claims apply to terrorist activity at the domestic level to explore the 
extent to which domestic terrorism differs from other forms of terrorism.  Specifically, I employ 
a negative binomial regression model with time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) data in order to 
observe if economic development and religion can help explain levels of domestic terrorism 
while controlling for other factors, including political rights, population, education, and past 
domestic terrorist incidents.  In line with much of the empirical evidence, I observe that poor 
countries are no more likely to suffer domestic terrorist attacks as wealthy ones.  Since domestic 
terrorism can resemble civil war – a type of violence that does often emerge as a result of 
economic problems – this finding is especially noteworthy.  Religious diversity in a country is 
correlated with a reduction in domestic terrorism, which stands in contrast to most research on 
transnational terrorism.  Despite the international attention to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Muslim countries seem no more prone to domestic terrorism than others. 
 
 
 Since the September 11 attacks, terrorism research has largely focused on transnational 
terrorism (Cronin 2002; Enders and Sandler 2002; Sandler 2003; Li and Schaub 2004; 
Rosendorff and Sandler 2005; Chalk 2007).  This has primarily been in reaction to the worldwide 
reach and recognition of al Qaeda, the Global War on Terrorism, and the availability of data on 
transnational terrorist incidents.  In contrast, domestic terrorism as a distinct phenomenon has 
been largely ignored despite the plethora of terrorist organizations that are principally domestic 
in nature, such as the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) in France, Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.   
 Furthermore, research that analyzes transnational and domestic terrorism jointly is 
helpful in understanding how terrorist activity differs from other forms of political violence, but 
conflates some conditions and mechanisms that are in fact unique to each form of terrorism.  
This is to say that transnational and domestic terrorism have certain distinct features that are 
overlooked when they are studied together.  This article aims to explore the conditions that 
facilitate domestic terrorism with a focus on two relationships that have dominated the literature 
and public discourse: the poverty-terrorism and religion-terrorism relationships.  Can economic 
development and religion help explain domestic terrorism? 
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 To inform this question, I perform a negative binomial regression on time-series, cross-
sectional (TSCS) data.  These panel data cover 195 countries over three years (2005-2007).  The 
dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents that occurred in a country in a 
year over a three-year period.  The explanatory variables include a country’s economic 
development and religious diversity and if the country is predominantly Muslim.  I include this 
last variable primarily to determine if the media’s coverage of al Qaeda and its affiliates 
indicates that Islamic countries experience more terrorism, at least on the domestic level, on 
average.  I control for political rights, population, education, and the existence (or absence) of 
domestic terrorism in the country in the previous year.   
 In short, I find that the relationship between economic development and domestic 
terrorism is not significant.  Neither poor nor rich countries seem especially likely to suffer 
domestic terrorism.  This is in accordance with other terrorism research but runs counter to the 
civil war literature, which finds that economic hardship is a key reason why many civil wars 
erupt.  More religiously diverse countries experience less domestic terrorism on average.  For the 
most part, this finding differs from research on the relationship between religious diversity and 
transnational terrorism, suggesting that certain conditions may enable one form of terrorism but 
not the other.  Finally, Muslim countries are no more prone to domestic terrorism than others.  I 
supplement these findings with post-estimation calculations to determine the impact of 




 Terrorism is a difficult term to define.  Many disagree over qualifying motivations, 
tactics, targets, and consequences.  Writing about the concept thirty years ago, Brian Michael 
Jenkins (1980, 1) states that terrorism has no exact or accepted definition.  And in the years 
since, it appears as though scholars, governments, and organizations have still not been able to 
reach a consensus.  As Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2008, 1) put it, “The search for an 
adequate definition of terrorism is still on.” 
Despite the difficulty in articulating an acceptable definition, terrorism does have several 
key features that distinguish it from other types of violence.  First, it is planned and calculated 
(Enders and Sandler 2002, 145; Krueger 2007, 14).  Terrorism is not spontaneously executed, but 
rather “premeditated and purposeful” (Crenshaw (1983, 2).  Terrorists devote much time, 
consideration, and care to the preparation process in order to increase the impact of their attacks.   
Second, terrorism is intrinsically violent (Enders and Sandler 2002, 145; Hoffman 2006, 
40).  Louise Richardson (2007, 4) argues, “If an act does not involve violence or the threat of 
violence, it is not terrorism.”  Often, the use of violence is a trait that distinguishes the terrorist 
group from the political party that supports it.  For example, Sinn Fein has not been violent itself, 
but has supported the Provisional IRA, a group that has used violence in its irredentist campaign.   
Third, terrorism is a political act (Hoffman 2006, 40; Richardson 2007, 5; Krueger 2007, 
14).  If a premeditated, violent act does not have a political dimension, such as a bank robbery, it 
is not terrorism.  Terrorism seeks to manipulate political standpoints rather than conquer an 
opponent (Crenshaw 1983, 2).  Fernando Reinares (2005, 120) points out, “Terrorism becomes 
political when it intends to affect the distribution of power and social cohesion within a given 
state jurisdiction or in a wider, international scenario.” 
 Fourth, terrorists design their attacks to have prolonged psychological effects beyond the 
immediate victims (Bjørgo 2005, 2; Hoffman 2006, 40).  Terrorism is effective when it generates 
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an atmosphere of fear.  The shock of the incident, compounded by continuous media coverage, 
conveys a message that no one is safe until the political environment changes.  For Reinares 
(2005, 120), “an act of violence is to be considered as terrorist when its psychical effects within a 
certain population or social aggregate, in terms of widespread emotional reactions such as fear 
and anxiety, are likely to condition attitudes and behavior in a determined direction.”   
 Fifth, terrorists communicate a message to an audience (Victoroff 2005, 4; Hoffman 
2006, 40-41).  In many cases, the target of the attack does not have much value to the 
perpetrators.  Instead, terrorists intend their attacks to convey statements to governments, 
citizenries, or rival groups.  Michel Wieviorka usefully distinguishes between primary and 
secondary audiences (Wieviorka 1995, 599).  Terrorists may carry out an attack in order to 
influence a primary audience, such as a government, so that it adopts (or stops) a certain course 
of action.  However, at the same time, the attack may send a signal to a secondary audience, such 
as a funder.  Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli and Western targets, for example, not only 
demonstrate the organization’s resolve in fighting against those that it believes are invaders but 
also aim to convince Iran and Syria that the group is competent in carrying out these regimes’ 
objectives in the region, thus securing their funding.   
 Finally, a defining characteristic is the deliberate targeting of civilians (Richardson 2007, 
6) or non-combatants (Bjørgo 2005, 2; Victoroff 2005, 4).  This is a controversial point and 
many scholars consciously do not include this facet in their definition of terrorism.1
 It can be difficult to differentiate domestic terrorism from other forms of violence, such 
as civil war, insurgency, and organized crime, but some defining traits stand out.  Domestic 
terrorism can resemble civil war when it takes the form of a protracted campaign.  Even when 
this is the case, however, it is a tactic employed as part of a larger violent movement.  Terrorism 
can take place within the context of civil war, but the two types of violence are not identical.
  However, 
the deliberate targeting of civilians (or non-combatants) is a defining feature that separates 
terrorism from other forms of political violence, especially insurgency.  Insurgents wish to 
overthrow their government using armed conflict, but they do not explicitly target civilians for 
this purpose – though they may kill civilians in the process of their campaigns.  Phil Williams 
(2008, 14) notes, “For terrorist organizations . . . the use of indiscriminate violence against 
civilian targets is not only central to their strategy but is also their defining characteristic.” 
 Terrorism comes in several varieties.  It is useful to think about “terrorisms” rather than 
“terrorism” (Miller 2007).  This differentiation is helpful in understanding transnational and 
domestic forms.  For a terrorist incident to be transnational, it must involve at least two 
countries.  Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (1999, 149) write, “Whenever a terrorist incident in 
one country involves victims, or targets, or institutions of another country, then the incident is 
characterized as transnational.”  The attacks on September 11 and March 11, 2004 in Madrid are 
well-known examples of transnational terrorism.  Domestic terrorism, in contrast, is terrorism 
that nationals carry out against their own country, including their government or their fellow 
countrymen and women.  It does not involve foreign victims, targets, or institutions.  Sandler 
(2003, 781) notes, “Domestic terrorism is home grown and has consequences for only the host 
country, its institutions, people, property, and policies.”  Much of the terrorism that occurs in 
Thailand and Sri Lanka, for example, is domestic in nature.   
2
                                                          
1 Hoffman’s (2006, 40-41) comprehensive definition of terrorism, for example, omits reference to civilians or 
non-combatants. 
2 See Sambanis (2008) for a discussion of terrorism within and outside civil war. 
  
Unlike civil war, domestic terrorism also includes isolated incidents that do not occur in 
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conjunction with civil conflict, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing.  Moreover, both domestic 
terrorist campaigns and insurgencies carry out violence against the state, but terrorists explicitly 
target civilians and civilian infrastructure as part of their strategy; casualties during insurgencies 
are usually a byproduct of violence.  Finally, unlike organized criminals, domestic terrorists seek 
to draw public attention to their cause and to broadcast a message to their audience.  In contrast, 
criminals use private bribery and extortion for financial gain, rather than seek public power. 
  
Theoretical Considerations  
 
Researchers have considered several conditions that favor terrorism.  Because studies on 
domestic terrorism are scarce, I rely on investigations that focus on terrorism in general and 
transnational terrorism in particular to form hypotheses about the relationships between 
economic development and domestic terrorism as well as between religion and domestic 
terrorism.  Findings from terrorism research should apply to the domestic level while those from 
transnational terrorism research may pertain to domestic terrorism, albeit in a more limited way. 
 
Economic Development and Terrorism 
 
 Researchers that consider terrorism in general (i.e. without differentiating between 
transnational and domestic terrorism) do not usually find economic development to be a 
significant explanatory factor in their analyses.  Alberto Abadie (2004) uses a country-level 
terrorist risk ratio that encompasses both transnational and domestic terrorism as his dependent 
variable and concludes that terrorist risks are not higher for poorer countries once other country-
level characteristics are considered.  Victor Asal and Karl Rethemeyer (2008) consider factors 
that explain the lethality of terrorist organizations, regardless whether they are transnational or 
domestic in nature, and find that the economic performance of the country that hosts the 
organization does not relate to the lethality of groups. 
 Intuitively, these findings make sense when considering terrorist activity around the 
world.  The lack of terrorism in Africa relative to other regions and the persistence of groups in 
West Europe, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Basque Fatherland and Freedom 
(ETA), and the FLNC, seem to suggest that poor countries are not more prone to terrorism than 
rich countries.  In fact, the Basque region in Spain, ETA’s regional base, is one of the most 
economically prosperous areas in the country.  Empirically, Andreas Feldmann and Maiju Perälä 
(2004) do not find an association between economic performance or structural economic 
conditions and the prevalence of terrorism in Latin America. 
 Researchers interested in the relationship between poverty and terrorism often measure 
economic performance with an economic output measure, such as GDP per capita, because it 
generally reflects a country’s standard of living.  It seems apparent, however, that some would 
resort to terrorist tactics because of relative rather than absolute poverty.  Ted Gurr (1970) argues 
that people rebel when they realize their relative deprivation – the discrepancy between their 
expectations of rewards, which their social environment legitimates, and their received rewards.  
In this sense, invidious comparison may spur violence (Pruitt and Kim 2004, 23-24).  
Empirically, however, researchers have not found this to be the case with regards to terrorism 
(Abadie 2004; Piazza 2006).  Walter Laqueur (1977, 12) explains, “Even if it could be shown for 
argument’s sake that the feeling of relative deprivation is widespread in a certain country, it does 
not follow that the handful of active terrorists are those most acutely suffering from relative 
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deprivation.” Although terrorists attack due to real or perceived injustices, they more often hold 
political rather than economic objections (Crenshaw 1981, 383-384). 
 Some scholars that only consider transnational terrorism in their analyses agree that 
poverty and terrorism do not generally share a relationship.  James Piazza (2006) uses 
transnational terrorist incidents from the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism publication as his dependent variable and finds that the “rooted-in-poverty” thesis is 
doubtful.  Instead, he advocates for the employment of social cleavage theory to explain terrorist 
activity since several demographic and political conditions, such as population, ethno-religious 
diversity, political repression, and the structure of party politics, are significant in his study.   
 Employing the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) 
dataset, Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková (2003, 139) write, “Once one accounts for the fact 
that poorer countries are less likely to have basic civil liberties, there is no difference in the 
number of terrorists springing from the poorest or the richest countries.”  Krueger and David 
Laitin (2008, 172) find that the sources of transnational terrorism have more to do with political 
repression than poverty.  Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Mogens Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen 
(2006) also use the ITERATE dataset, but instead of considering the outcome variable in terms 
of count data, they use a dichotomous measure to capture the absence or presence of 
transnational terrorism.  Also in contrast to the Krueger and Malečková model, they are 
interested in determining if a country’s economic development attracts rather than produces 
transnational terrorist attacks.  Despite these differences, however, they conclude that poverty, 
inequality, and economic growth are unassociated with transnational terrorism.3
Although these studies are in agreement in suggesting that religious diversity is irrelevant 
in explaining terrorism, one should be careful in applying findings from research that treats 
terrorism as a general phenomenon to either transnational or domestic terrorism specifically 
 
 
Religion and Terrorism 
 
What role does religion play in explaining terrorism?  Given the overwhelming media 
coverage on religious terrorist activity, it would seem that it matters considerably.  Audrey 
Cronin (2002-03, 41) argues that religious terrorism poses the greatest threat to international 
security, in part, because “religious terrorists consider themselves to be unconstrained by secular 
values or laws.”  Similarly, Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) state that religious and religious-
ethnonationalist terrorist groups are the most lethal in their attacks relative to other groups. 
Religious terrorist organizations might be more prevalent and deadlier than groups that 
identify with other ideologies, such as socialist or right-wing organizations, but research on the 
relationship between a country’s level of religious diversity and its overall experience with 
terrorism finds that the two conditions are generally unrelated (Abadie 2004).  This suggests that 
religiously homogeneous and heterogeneous countries are equally at risk for suffering terrorism.  
Studies that only consider transnational terrorism generally agree with this conclusion (Kurrild-
Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2008).  Specifically, Kurrild-
Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen find that a country’s level of religious diversity does not 
help to elucidate why a transnational terrorist event originates from within a country.  Krueger 
and Laitin’s study concurs, and also reveals that a country’s religious composition does not 
matter in attracting a transnational attack either.    
                                                          
3 See Li and Schaub (2004) and Blomberg and Hess (2008) for alternative findings on the relationship between 
economic development and transnational terrorism. 
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without empirical testing.  Transnational and domestic terrorist activities may have different 
permissive conditions and motivational causes that become confused when studied jointly.  For 
example, one study reveals that more religiously diverse countries experience fewer domestic 
terrorist incidents (Blomberg and Hess 2008).4
 The model’s dependent variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents that 
occurred in a country in a year for the years, 2005-2007 (Domestic Terrorism).  These figures 
  This suggests that diversity matters in explaining 
domestic terrorism, but not transnational terrorism – a finding that would have been missed had 
domestic terrorism not been studied separately. 
In addition to religious diversity, a country’s predominant religious affiliation may matter 
in explaining the outbreak of terrorism.  High-profile terrorist activities across the Middle East, 
especially in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, suggest that Muslim countries produce 
more terrorism than non-Muslim countries.  Empirically, however, this has not been found to be 
the case (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Bravo and Dias 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2008).  
Krueger and Laitin, in particular, reveal that Muslim countries are no more or less likely to 
produce or suffer from transnational terrorism.  This implies that media coverage may 
underreport terrorist activities that are not Islamist, such as those in Latin America, and further 




 I hypothesize the following relationships based on research that examines the connections 
between economic development and terrorism and religion and terrorism, as noted in the 
previous section: 
 
H1: Economic development and domestic terrorism should be unrelated.  Domestic terrorism is 
an action that attempts to persuade an audience, usually a government, to adopt or to cease a 
certain policy.  Its motives are always political but seldom economic; thus, it should be that 
economic development does not generally correspond with domestic terrorism.   
 
H2: Religious diversity and domestic terrorism should be negatively related.  Not only is this 
consistent with the Blomberg and Hess (2008) study on domestic terrorism, but it is often the 
case that religious plurality in a country promotes tolerance.  Although it may be irrelevant in 
explaining transnational terrorism, religious diversity should play a mitigating role in the 
outbreak of domestic terrorism. 
 
H3: Muslim countries are no more likely to experience domestic terrorism than non-Muslim 
countries.  Despite the overwhelming number of domestic terrorist incidents in countries like 
Afghanistan and Iraq, there are an abundance of campaigns in non-Muslim countries as well, 
such as Spain, Sri Lanka, and Colombia.  It should be shown that domestic terrorism is not a 
phenomenon unique to Muslim countries.  
 




                                                          
4 Blomberg and Hess (2008) also find this to be true when they only consider transnational terrorism. 
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come from RAND’s Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents.  RAND defines terrorism as 
violence or the threat of violence that is intended to create fear and alarm and to coerce certain 
actions, maintaining that terrorism is politically motivated, generally directed against civilian 
targets, and carried out by either a group or an individual.  This definition resembles the six 
factors of terrorism highlighted in the above section.  RAND considers terrorist incidents as 
transnational if they involve a foreign entity, such as a perpetrator or target.  Otherwise, they 
label them as domestic.5
To measure economic development, I use GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars for each 
country for each year in the dataset (GDP).  GDP per capita is a suitable measure of economic 
development since it gives a good indication of a country’s standard of living.  These numbers 






 To measure the level of political rights, I use figures from Freedom House for each 
country for each year in the dataset.  The index ranges from 1 to 7.  “1” represents a strong 
presence of political rights in the country (e.g. Denmark) while “7” represents an absence of 
political rights (e.g. Eritrea).  Freedom House generates figures on political rights by evaluating 
the country’s electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of 
government.  Many find that countries with medium levels of political rights experience more 
terrorism than either highly democratic or highly authoritarian regimes (Abadie 2004; Reinares 
 
For religion, I use a measure of religious diversity (Religious Diversity) and a dummy 
variable for whether a country is Muslim or not (Muslim).  The religious diversity variable comes 
from Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).  This index represents the likelihood that two people chosen 
randomly from the same country belong to different religious groups.  It includes 294 different 
religions in 215 countries and ranges between “0” and “1.”  Higher values represent more 
religious diversity.  Figures are only available for 2001 so I use them for all three years under the 
assumption that religious diversity in countries remained relatively constant from 2001 through 
2007.  Regarding the binary variable, if the CIA World Factbook reports that the majority of the 
country’s population is Muslim, I label that country as “1.”  Otherwise, I label it “0.”  




I include several theoretically-relevant control variables in the model, including level of 
political rights (Political Rights), population (Population), level of education (Education), and 
the number of domestic terrorist incidents in the previous year (Past Incidents). 
                                                          
5 Most databases, including RAND’s, rely on media accounts to collect data.  The principal challenge is that 
states with restricted or weak media outlets may underreport the number of incidents in the country.  
Nonetheless, RAND’s is the most current and complete database available on domestic terrorism.  
6 To assess if relative deprivation matters in explicating domestic terrorism, I rerun the model using GINI 
coefficients (GINI) instead of GDP per capita for each country for each year.  These statistics come from the 
2007/2008 and 2009 Human Development Reports.  These data are highly problematic.  Figures for 69 of 195 
countries for 2005 are missing; 53 are missing for 2007.  Most countries that are missing statistics for 2005 are 
missing them for 2007 as well.  The United Nations Development Programme does not provide 2006 data so I 
use the 2007 figures for 2006 under the assumption that figures would not have changed much from 2006 to 
2007. 
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2005; Testas 2004).  This is because strong democratic and authoritarian regimes have effective 
counterterrorism capabilities, and because some opportunists decide to engage in violence during 
transitions from totalitarian to democratic systems (Snyder 2000). 
To measure population for each country for each year, I use figures from the International 
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (April 2010).  Some studies find that larger 
populations experience more terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004).  Since larger country’s have more 
diverse groups, minorities may resort to terrorism to influence their governments (Li and Schaub 
2004).  Joe Eyerman (1998) also notes that larger populations are harder to police. 
 The education measure is an education index, which comes from the 2007/2008 and 2009 
Human Development Reports and the Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update (2008).  
The United Nations Development Programme generates the education index on the basis of the 
adult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) and the combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, 
secondary, and tertiary schools (one-third weight).  One missing value for 2006 was replaced 
with a 2007 figure and seven for 2005 were replaced with 2006 data.  The effect that education 
has on terrorism is mixed, but many find the relationship to be nonexistent or weak (Krueger and 
Malečková 2003; Drakos and Gofas 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; 
Krueger and Laitin 2008).  However, I include it in the model since domestic terrorists in 
particular may carry out their attacks in response to an overall lack of education access.  
 Finally, I control for the number of domestic terrorist attacks that each country 
experienced in the previous year.  Terrorism is path dependent in that past violence breeds 
present violence, which encourages future violence.  This is because a culture of terrorism 
enables terrorists to continue their activity.  Successful attacks ensure future funding from donors 
and break down psychological hesitations about carrying out future acts.  Data for this variable 
also come from the RAND database.  Figure 1 provides information on all variables. 
 
Unit of Analysis: Country-Year
Variable Year(s) Definition Source N Median Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Dependent
Domestic Terrorism 2005-2007 583 0 26 215.7584 0 3,892
Explanatory
GDP 2005-2007 GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars International Monetary Fund 543 3,370.11 10,416.98 16,033.80 106.88 106,983.30
GINI 2005, 2007 GINI coefficient Human Development Reports 410 39.50 40.8520 9.3556 24.70 74.30
Religious Diversity 2001 Religious fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) 576 0.4545 0.4363 0.2322 0.0023 0.8603
Muslim 2010 1 = Majority of country is Muslim CIA World Factbook 583 0 0.2264 0.4189 0 1
0 = Otherwise
Control
Political Rights 2005-2007 Level of political rights Freedom House 583 3 3.3448 2.1434 1 7
Population 2005-2007 Population (in millions) International Monetary Fund 543 7.4410 35.8966 133.1428 0.05 1,321.29
Education 2005-2007 Education index Human Development Reports 553 0.864 0.7917 0.1790 0.255 0.993
Past Incidents 2004-2006 583 0 22 19.9304 0 3,892
Total number of domestic terrorist 
incidents
RAND's Database of Worldwide 
Terrorism
Total number of domestic terrorist 
incidents in previous year











 Because the dependent variable in my analysis is an event count variable, I use a negative 
binomial regression model to produce estimates.  The data suffer from overdispersion but unlike 
the Poisson regression model, the negative binomial allows the conditional variance of the 
dependent variable to exceed the conditional mean.  Models that employ time-series, cross-
sectional (TSCS) data often experience heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation in the error 
term.  To address these problems, I use robust standard errors clustered over countries.  
Controlling for the number of domestic terrorist incidents that a country experienced in the 
previous year and including dummy variables for 2006 and 2007 (2005 is the baseline year) in 
the model should also help to deal with temporal dependence.  I also perform post-estimation 






Results are provided in Figure 2.  Economic development, as measured by GDP per 
capita, is not significant in the model, which supports the first hypothesis.7
                                                          
7 In order to see if relative rather than absolute deprivation may be a factor in explaining domestic terrorism, I 
rerun the model using the GINI variable instead of GDP.  Full results for this model are not provided, but GINI 
is not significant (P > |z| = 0.137) while the substantive results for all other variables remain consistent.  This is 
in line with studies that focus on terrorism in general (Abadie 2004) and transnational terrorism (Piazza 2006).  
However, major problems exist with the GINI variable (i.e. missing data) so caution in this interpretation is 
necessary. 
  This suggests that a 
country’s economic status does not seem to be associated with its experience with domestic 
 Economic Development, Religion, and the Conditions for Domestic Terrorism | 37 
 
terrorism in either a positive or negative direction, implying that terrorists are as likely to come 
from wealthy countries as economically weak ones. 
 Although this finding is in line with the terrorism literature, it is especially noteworthy 
because of the distinct nature of domestic terrorism.  Domestic terrorism includes isolated 
homegrown incidents, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing and Sarin attack on the Tokyo 
subway (both in 1995), as well as prolonged internal terrorist movements.  In some cases, these 
movements become so powerful that they provoke civil war.  Examples include the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka and Shining Path in Peru.  Thus, domestic terrorist campaigns and civil wars can be 
difficult to distinguish in reality.  This is interesting because research shows that poverty is an 
important factor in the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Sambanis 2008).  Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998, 7) emphasize, “Civil war is 
overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low income countries.”  Thus, despite its resemblance to civil 
war in some cases, domestic terrorism does not appear to be brought about by low economic 
development.  If data become available, future research should disaggregate domestic terrorism 
between isolated events and protracted movements to see if their explanatory conditions differ.  
Nicholas Sambanis (2008, 201) argues, “economic development strategies that increase per 
capita income or education levels might help reduce terrorism if they help reduce the prevalence 
of civil war since terrorism can easily occur in civil war.  But economic development alone is 
unlikely to succeed in reducing terrorism of the sort that takes place outside of the context of 
civil war.”  Thus, economic development strategies may reduce domestic terrorism if it exists in 
conjunction with civil war, but otherwise they may not. 
 The model suggests that religious diversity is a factor in explaining domestic terrorism.  
In accordance with the second hypothesis, which is primarily based on the Blomberg and Hess 
(2008) study, more religiously heterogeneous countries observe fewer domestic terrorist attacks 
on average.  This stands in contrast to the majority of research on transnational terrorism.  On 
one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the presence of more religious groups in a country 
would incite terrorist violence under the assumption that some religious factions would adopt 
terrorist tactics against others.  However, it may be that the presence of several religions in a 
society encourages people to be more tolerant of other religions.  For example, Australia has a 
high religious diversity level, but experiences very few attacks.  Moreover, it may also be that 
small religious minorities in countries that are overwhelmingly affiliated with one religion carry 
out terrorist violence against the dominant religious group in an effort to stop real or perceived 
rights abuses.  This may explain countries like Thailand in which the Pattani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO) strives to achieve independence for the Muslim community in the 
country’s southern provinces.  Finally, members of the same religion may adopt terrorism 
against one another because of varying interpretations of religious texts or priorities regarding 
religious values.  Afghanistan, for example, is religiously homogenous, but suffers high levels of 
within-religion violence. 
 Supporting the third hypothesis, the model shows that Muslim countries are no more or 
less prone to domestic terrorist activity.  This is in agreement with the empirical research, but 
runs counter to the impression that media coverage on terrorism gives, which suggests that non-
Muslim terrorist incidents are underreported.  Muslim countries, however, may be more likely to 
suffer suicide terrorism (Wade and Reiter 2007). 
 Some of the control variables show interesting results.  The relationship between 
education and domestic terrorism is positive and significant.  Countries with higher education 
levels experience more domestic terrorism.  This suggests that although education can provide 
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opportunities to participate in political processes, it may also equip terrorists with the resources 
and connections necessary to carry out attacks against the government or rival groups.  Higher 
education levels may also enable terrorists to outmaneuver counterterrorist efforts.  For example, 
in Spain, ETA had traditionally been able to infiltrate the Ertzaintza – the Basque police force – 
in order to preempt law enforcement activities.  Moreover, it could be that countries with low 
levels of education may not maintain populations that have the resources or skills to execute 
terrorism. 
 Moreover, the model supports the notion that terrorism is path dependent.  Countries that 
experience domestic terrorism in the past are more likely to endure it in the future.  This is 
because a history of terrorism may help to secure future donor funding, attract new fighters, and 
reduce reservations about conducting acts of violence.   
 The political rights variable is insignificant, suggesting that politically free and repressive 
countries are as likely to face domestic terrorism.  Nonetheless, I explore this link further.  
Theory suggests that the relationship between political freedom and terrorism is non-monotonic 
(Abadie 2004; Testas 2004).  Martha Crenshaw (1981, 396) argues that terrorism is a 
consequence of state behavior and concludes that “Government reactions that are inconsistent, 
wavering between tolerance and repression, seem most likely to encourage terrorism.”  Countries 
in political transition or that maintain medium levels of political rights seem more likely to 
experience terrorism.  To assess if this is the case, I calculate the mean number of domestic 
terrorist incidents within countries across the three-year timeframe and then across countries for 
each of the seven levels of political rights.8  Figure 3 shows this graph.  The graph supports the 






                                                          
8 Because Iraq experiences an overwhelming number of domestic terrorist attacks, thus disrupting the scale of 
the graph, I exclude it.  The mean number of attacks across the three-year period for Iraq is 2,828, which is 
nearly six times as large as the next highest mean.  Its inclusion, however, does not change the general trend. 
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Expected Count Tabulations 
 
 The regression model suggests that a country’s levels of religious diversity and education 
influence its experience with domestic terrorism.  But if the religious composition or overall 
education level of a country were to change, how would this affect its experience with domestic 
terrorist violence?  A limitation of maximum likelihood estimation models is that they do not 
provide a reliable R2; thus, it is difficult to determine the extent to which significant independent 
variables affect the outcome variable.  However, expected count tabulations can show the change 
in the outcome if a significant predictor were to change.9
Scenarios Expected Count Mean S.E.
2.022763 0.384503
Religious Diversity  Set at Its Lowest (0.0023) 5.077131 2.373506
Religious Diversity  Set at Its Highest (0.8603) 0.979340 0.480771
Education  Set at Its Lowest Value (0.255) 0.379114 0.428861
Education  Set at Its Highest Value (0.993) 4.459790 1.650509
Note: All variables in the model are set at their mean except for the variable listed.
Figure 4
Expected Count Means for Domestic Terrorist Attacks, Various Scenarios
All Variables Held at Their Mean
  Here, they can demonstrate the extent 
to which religious diversity and education affect domestic terrorism by allowing for changes in 
their values and holding other variables at their mean. 
 
 
 Figure 4 shows these tabulations.  When all of the model’s independent variables are held 
at their own means, a country should experience two domestic terrorist attacks.  This is to say 
that an “average” country (average in the sense that it maintains average levels of all of the 
independent variables) is expected to experience two attacks.  However, if all variables remain at 
their mean, except for religious diversity, which is reduced to the level experienced in Yemen – 
the lowest in the dataset – a country would suffer approximately five incidents.  This is three 
more than the average.  The regression model suggests that religious homogeneity increases the 
likelihood of domestic terrorism, but this calculation shows by how much (i.e. by three more 
attacks).  Examples of countries that are religiously homogenous and terrorism-prone include 
Colombia and Afghanistan.  On the other hand, if a country were as religiously diverse as South 
Africa – the highest in the dataset – they would only experience one domestic terrorist incident 
on average, holding all other variables at their mean.  This is one less than the mean.  Malawi 
and Australia are examples of religiously diverse, low-terrorism countries. 
 Moreover, if a country had an education level as high as New Zealand’s (while 
experiencing average levels of all other independent variables), it would experience four 
incidents on average, which is two more than the average.  France, Spain, and Greece are 
representative of high-education, high-terrorism countries.  If its education level were as low as 
Burkino Faso’s, it would experience virtually no attacks, which is representative of several 
                                                          
9 To calculate expected count tabulations, I use CLARIFY software.  See Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2001) 
for information about and access to this software.  For detailed information about the utility of post-estimation 
tabulations, see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). 
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African countries, such as Chad and Niger.  These calculations help to show how changes in 
education levels affect the level of domestic terrorism that a country experiences.10
                                                          
10 Of course any increase in domestic terrorism is dangerous and unwelcome; however, the type (i.e. bombing, 
assassination, kidnapping) and lethality (i.e. number of deaths or injuries) of these incidents are important but 
unaccounted for in these scenarios. 




 This study has aimed to evaluate the conditions that foster domestic terrorism in an effort 
to elucidate this phenomenon and highlight its differences from transnational terrorism.  
Specifically, it has endeavored to see if economic development and religion matter in creating 
the space for domestic terrorism to occur.  In line with other terrorism research, I fail to find 
evidence that development, measured as overall economic output or income inequality, brings 
about domestic terrorism.  Religion helps to explain terrorist activity, which stands in contrast to 
most research on transnational terrorism.  Religiously homogenous countries seem to experience 
more terrorism while Muslim countries are no more or less likely to suffer from attacks.  This 
might suggest that Western media outlets overstate the degree of Islamist terrorism, placing less 
attention on non-Islamist terrorist organizations.  Moreover, education levels and past 
experiences with domestic terrorism appear to be important predictors of future domestic 
terrorism.  Finally, I do not find that politically repressive countries are more prone to terrorism 
than politically free states, but transitional countries – those with medium levels of political 
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